Better late than never, although 5 years late, the Carter Center has finally published its finding from the observation of the stolen 2005 Ethiopian Election.
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Dr Berhanu Nega’s comment on the Carter Center Report;
Ginbot 7 Dimts Radio, 11th March 2010:
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Upon the invitation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, The Carter Center observed Ethiopia’s May 15, 2005 elections for the national and regional parliaments. The May elections marked an historic event in the country, as Ethiopia witnessed its first genuinely competitive campaign period with multiple parties fielding strong candidates. Unfortunately, what began with a comparatively open period of campaigning and an orderly voting process on election day, was followed by flawed counting and tabulation processes in many areas, repeated incidents of serious post-electoral violence including the killing of some many dozens of persons during electoral protests, a significant delay in finalizing election results, and an ineffective complaints review and investigation processes. In spite of the positive pre election developments, therefore, the Center’s observation mission concludes that the 2005 electoral process did not fulfill Ethiopia’s obligations to ensure the exercise of political rights and freedoms necessary for genuinely democratic elections.
Background. As an international observer mission, The Carter Center sought to provide an impartial assessment of the election process by evaluating the pre-election period, the May 15 voting, counting, and tabulation processes, plus post-election phases including, the complaints investigation process, the August 21 re-elections and the Somali region elections. Throughout the observation, mission leaders, staff and observers met with government representatives, political party leaders, election officials, civil society members in the capital and at the regional and local levels. Field staff and observers coordinated with the election observation missions from the European Union and African Union in an effort to maximize observation coverage.
Pre-election period. The pre-election period witnessed unprecedented participation by opposition parties and independent candidates, and an unmatched level of political debate in the state dominated electronic and print media and at public forums held across the country. Political parties agreed to a Party Code of Conduct, committing themselves to compliance with provisions calling for fair play and supporting peaceful political competition.
Ethiopian civil society organizations were active in the pre-election period, observing election preparations and sponsoring a series of televised debates on public policy issues between government officials and opposition leaders.
Domestic observation, however, was hampered by a late National Election Board (NEBE) decision to deny some civil society groups permission to observe polling day. Although the Supreme Court overturned this decision, the ruling came only days before election-day, thereby severely inhibiting domestic observers’ ability to deploy widely throughout the country.
Election day. The May 15 voting process progressed relatively smoothly with Carter Center observers reporting that polling was calm and peaceful in the polling stations visited, with only limited incidents of disturbances reported. However, problems began to emerge during the counting and tabulation phases, with significant irregularities and delays in vote tabulation and a large number of electoral complaints.
Preliminary but unconfirmed reports of election results from the political parties began to circulate on election night suggesting that the opposition parties had scored significant electoral gains, especially in Addis Ababa and other urban areas. On the night of the election, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi declared a one-month ban on public demonstrations in the capital and brought the Addis Ababa security forces (soon to be under the command of the opposition that won Addis Ababa) under the control of the office of the Prime Minister.
Post-election results and violence. After unofficial reports circulated in May showing the opposition controlling the majority of seats, preliminary results released over remainder of May and through June indicated the ruling EPRDF controlled a majority of seats. Opposition parties claimed fraud and organized protests, including taxi strikes and student demonstrations at the University of Addis Ababa. On June 3, the Center released a statement (see appendix) on its post-election observation, noting observers’ reports of improperly secured ballot boxes, intimidation and harassment of opposition agents, and calling on all sides to pursue legal channels to investigate complaints and resolve disputes.
Tensions continue to spread across Addis Ababa in the following days. On June 6-8, more than 40 people were reported killed by the security forces’ crackdown on post-election protestors. The Center released a short statement on June 9 (see appendix) expressing alarm about the death and violence, and calling on the government to curb the extreme measures of the security forces, and urging all sides to pursue peaceful means to resolve disputes.
Complaints review processes. In light of the political violence and killings, controversies over the tabulation process, and the overall deterioration of the post-election environment, the NEBE decided to postpone any further announcement of official results for one month until July 8, to allow a cooling off period and provide space for the parties to agree on an ad hoc election complaints review process. Between June 10-14, the political parties negotiated a multi-phased review process, and after an initial disagreement they signed an agreement on June 14, which established ad hoc Complaints Review Boards (CRBs) and Complaints Investigation Panels (CIPs). Electoral complaints were to be submitted in writing to the NEBE, along with all available evidence and the CRBs would then rule on which complaints to submit to CIPs for further investigatation.
During June and July, the Center observed the conduct of the review and investigation processes of the CRBs and CIPs. The first Complaints Review Board (CRB1) reviewed the entire body of complaints. A second review board (CRB2) allowed parties to lodge an administrative appeal of complaints rejected by CRB1. Following the reviews by the CRBs, the CIPs investigated complaints and recommended a course of action to the NEBE, which made the final decision over the appropriate course of action.
During the CRB/CIP process, 383 complaints from the polling station, constituency level, and general complaints against the NEBE were submitted to the CRBs for consideration. The CRB1 deemed 151 of these to be worthy of further investigation by 26 CIPs. Complaints not approved by CRB1 were then appealed to the CRB2, which approved 29 more complaints for review by 18 new CIPs. 179 constituencies were affected.
While the CRB/CIP process went forward, the NEBE’s tabulation processes continued simultaneously. At the start of the CRB/CIP process, the only official results had the opposition winning an unexpected 29 out of 40 seats. However, further into the complaint review process, preliminary results were released on July 26 which indicated that the opposition controlled 172 seats of the announced 435, a significant shift from percentages indicated by the early partial results. The delayed release of results and the problems that emerged during the complaints process combined to create further tensions in the political environment.
Based on extensive observations of the CRB/CIP processes, the Center ultimately concluded that while the CRB/CIP processes provided important space for electoral dispute resolution processes, overall the NEBE’s complaints and review processes did not provide an adequate means for resolving serious disputes. (See Carter Center statement of September 15).
August re-run and Somali region elections. Based on the results of the CRB/CIP processes, the NEBE decided to rerun elections in 31 constituencies on August 21, 2005, the same day as the Somali region elections. The Carter Center observed both elections. Although 26 of the 31 revotes were held in constituencies provisionally won by opposition candidates, the ruling EPRDF won all 31 seats.
In addition to a few minor administrative problems, Carter Center observers reported a series of serious flaws in the August 21 polling process. These included credible reports of an unnecessarily large security force presence and intimidation of opposition candidates and supporter. Overall, it seemed clear that many opposition candidates surrendered the contested seats, resulting in a sweep by the EPRDF coalition, even overturning previous defeats in five constituencies.
Voting in the Somali region was chaotic and disorganized, and included reports of significant irregularities. Individual clan leaders held complete authority to decide the political parties listed on the ballot in their constituencies. While this appears to have been common accepted practice in the region, Carter Center observers reported serious concerns about the integrity of the process.
Final results. The NEBE announced final election results on September 5, 2005 with the ruling EPRDF winning 327 seats (60 percent of the total vote), government affiliated parties claiming an additional 45 seats (8 percent of the total vote) and opposition parties winning 174 seats (32 percent of the total vote). Opposition parties rejected the results, citing the various irregularities and the flawed complaints review process.
On September 15, the Center released a final overall statement on the elections, which noted that while the pre-election process was laudable, the post-election period was marked by a series of problems, delays in vote tabulation, protests and violence, serious electoral complaints, and a prolonged dispute resolution process. The statement concluded that the CRB/CIP process did not provide an adequate means for a fair resolution of disputes. The statement also noted while a majority of the 547 individual constituency results appeared credible, there were a considerable number of the constituency results that had significant problems and whose credibility is in question. Whether this smaller group of constituencies was sufficient to change the outcome at the national or regional level could not be determined based on the evidence available to the Carter Center. Finally, the Center’s statement also called on dissatisfied parties to file appeals to the high court.
Unfortunately, political tensions continued to increase, and some members of the opposition decided to boycott the seating of Parliament in October. This was followed by a series of protests and another outbreak of political violence throughout the country in early November. According to an independent commission appointed to investigate the post-electoral violence, the government response resulted in the death of 193 people at the hands of the security forces between June and November along with the arrest of opposition leaders and supporters. 1
Overall, the center finds that in spite of the positive developments in the pre-election period,
the 2005 electoral process did not fulfill Ethiopia’s obligations to ensure political rights and freedoms necessary for genuinely democratic elections. The period following May 15 was marked by highly charged political tensions, inflammatory rhetoric from all political sides, several days of protests and electoral violence, killings and other human rights abuses by government forces, delays in vote tabulation, a large number of electoral complaints, a prolonged and problematic electoral dispute resolution process, and the resurgence of government and opposition clashes months after the conclusion of electoral activities.
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