US Rights Report Lists Ethiopian Opposition Leader as Political Prisoner

http://www.enufforethiopia.org/Images/Birtukan_Mideksa_Jailed_123008.jpg

Peter Heinlein | Addis Ababa

http://www.paaia.org/galleries/default-image/state_department_seal_260x260.jpgThe U.S. State Department’s annual human rights reports says Ethiopia is holding several hundred political prisoners, including the leader of one of the country’s largest opposition parties. Ethiopia has reacted strongly to past U.S. criticisms of its rights record.

The 2009 human rights report says Birtukan Mideksa, president of Ethiopia’s opposition Unity for Democracy and Justice party, was held in solitary confinement for the first six months of the year despite a court ruling that it violated her constitutional rights. The 61-page document says there were credible reports that Birtukan’s mental health deteriorated significantly during the year.

Birtukan was among scores of political activists sentenced to life in prison following Ethiopia’s disputed 2005 election, then later pardoned. She was jailed again in December, 2008 and ordered to serve out her life sentence after refusing to apologize for saying she had not requested the pardon.

The 35-year-old single mother was recently listed by the U.N. Human Rights Council as a victim of arbitrary detention, and by Amnesty International as a prisoner of conscience. But at news conference late last year, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi staunchly defended her re-imprisonment, saying it was based on ‘elementary notions of the rule of law’.

“She had her day in court, was sentenced by this independent court,” he said. “This lady was advised by anybody, everybody who could talk to her, including diplomats, elders and even some members of her party that it would be wrong for her to go to prison simply because she wouldn’t correct the wrong statement that she made and expose herself to reinstatement of the court’s decision. She refused to do so because she was convinced some human rights organizations abroad, her supporters and sympathizers both abroad and here, would spring her out of prison. We knew that was a very dangerous miscalculation.”

The 2009 State Department report alleges numerous violations of press and academic freedom in Ethiopia, as well as what are called restrictions of the people’s right to change their government peacefully.

With Ethiopia’s next national elections less than three months away, the report noted that the ruling party and its allies had won all but three of the seats contested in the 2008 nationwide local elections. The report also questioned the government claim of a 93-percent voter turnout in the 2008 vote, saying no foreign observers had been allowed.

An Ethiopian foreign ministry spokesman said no response has yet been prepared to this year’s State Department report. But in answer to the 2008 report, the government published a 68-page booklet calling the allegations ‘baseless work of rumormongers and political opportunists’. It said much of the information came from non-governmental organizations and opposition groups which survive on U.S. government funding.

Ethiopia’s parliament has since approved a law forbidding any NGO that receives more than 10 percent of its funds from foreign sources from  promoting human and democratic rights.

The acting U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia, John Yates, Thursday defended the contents of the 2009 report. He said the authors make every effort to verify all information in the document.

“We gather information from lots of different sources, then we here in Addis and our people in the United States try hard to examine and verify reports before putting them into the human rights report,” said John Yates. “We consult a lot of people, but we don’t accept anything at face value until we do our best to verify, and if we can’t verify to some degree, it’s not included.”

The annual State Department human rights report is mandated by Congress. This year’s two-million word document covers conditions in 194 countries.

Introducing the 2009 report, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called it the most comprehensive record available on the status of human rights worldwide.

Source: VOA News

Meles Zenawi’s Lessons of the 2005 Election and His Action Plan for 2010

By Fekade Shewakena

The stabbing of an opposition parliamentary candidate and the brutal beating of another in Tigrai by Meles Zenawi’s thugs last week, only days after the latter made a code loaded speech at the TPLF anniversary in Mekele, where he referred to his opponents as the mud, the riffraff, and the enemy, fall perfectly in line with the tactic and strategy set out for “winning” the May 2010 election.   All indications, including the rush by government officials to explain how the victim died before even any preliminary police investigation, show that Meles Zenawi’s finger prints are all over the killing.  Some ferenjis may be willfully fooled.  We Ethiopians know the drill and we get it.  That it happened in Tigrai, the ethnic homeland of Meles Zenawi, seems to have made the brutality more sensational but similar instances occur widely and in large numbers in other parts of the country.  What this case may have loudly demonstrated is perhaps the fact that no ethnic elite in power can oppress other ethnic groups and leaves the people of its own ethnic homeland in freedom.  I hope our brothers and sisters from Tigrai are getting the message loud and clear, that they are only one disagreement away from the TPLF from being stabbed to death – just one attempt away at making choices and decisions for and by themselves.

As he repeatedly keeps reminding us, Meles Zenawi has taken lessons from the debacles of the May 2005 national election and will not repeat the same mistake.   He even boasted that his organization (TPLF) hasn’t made the same mistake more than once.   The lessons he learnt and action plans derived from the lessons of the 2005 election are simple and least sophisticated.  This time there is no taking a “calculated risk” as in 2005 by a slight opening of any door for democracy.  The only game left in town now is how to hold something that can be referred to as an election and satisfy the donors, who insist that they need some kind of election to show  for their tax payers that they are spending their money on and with an “elected” government.   Meles doesn’t want this election if it is meant to be a democratic exercise. The Ethiopian people also do not want this kind of election and if asked will prefer to spend the millions of dollars spent on this sham exercise on buying food.  Only these lords of our poverty want this election.   And it has to be said clearly that it is these donors who insist on a useless exercise and get our people killed, dehumanized and turn their already miserable lives into hell.

Meles knows that he has the monopoly of violence in the country. He also knows the violence he so far perpetrated against the Ethiopian people did not make any dent on his relationship with his Western donors in whose honor we seem to be holding these disastrous periodic elections.  Meles has stayed in power long enough to understand that his donors are full of hypocrisy, that none of them pursued their bluff to ask him to account for the crimes he committed in 2005.   Deep down in his heart I think he despises them. He at least has seen them how they got all over poor Mugabe for killing a small fraction of the number of people he killed.   Meles knows that as long as he gives them the illusion of a stable country, they don’t give a hoot for democracy or the rule of law.   Armed with this knowledge, Meles has made a plan.  It is a simple plan – move the election violence from the post election to the pre election period and spread it over time.

Any serious observers of Ethiopia can identify some six broad forms through which Meles Zenawi’s pre election violence is packaged and delivered to the Ethiopian people. Note that these tactics are applied separately or in any combination as the condition presents itself. Here are some of them:

  1. The use of direct and blunt force: This involves direct application of force including killings and beating. This tactic is employed by spreading the violence over time and space so that the drip, drip, in blood does not make it look like a massacre.  You can kill 100 people in a day at one location and not look good. If you do that over a period of 100 days in different places, you don’t look like you have even killed a fly. The reports of Human rights organizations on Ethiopia are replete with this kind of political crimes including torture and other degrading treatments. There are hundreds of people thrown in jail and forgotten. Torturing critics and suspects and forcing false confessions are rampant. We see them daily. Only our donors have closed their eyes.
  2. Intimidation and harassment: Anybody suspected of supporting the opposition is harassed as anti people, anti development (as if anybody needs more poverty), pro terrorist, pro OLF, Pro Ginbot 7 etc. As I am writing this, I listened to a UDJ election candidate in Arba Gugu telling the voice of America that he was told by local officials that he cannot be an opposition candidate while drawing a salary from his government job and that some official vowed to cut his tongue and feed it to him if he doesn’t stop his candidacy.  They have so far succeeded in intimidating independent journalists to self sensor or flee the country.  Meles makes self fulfilling prophecies such as accusing the opposition of collaboration with terrorists, Shabia etc.  This is an important method in TPLF’s tool box.  It has been used in 2005 and had proven to work.  Anyone remember the accusation of the CUD that it is like the Rwandan Interhamwe in 2005? When they took the CUD leaders to the kangaroo court, it was only time that they accuse them of genocide.    Such methods are now being used both to intimidate and punish opponents. This time the opposition is accused of harboring ambitions of making this election like the elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe.  You know, those bastards who demanded a coalition government and ruined the meaning of democracy!
  3. Use the abject poverty in the country as a political tool to recruit supporters and coerce people into falling in line: Zenawi’s party has recruited millions of members by making membership a choice without alternative. If you want to rot in poverty and stay unemployed upon graduation you can refuse to fill out the membership forms.  Discrimination in employment, promotion on the job based on membership to the party is being practiced in broad daylight.   It has been declared that higher education is the exclusive preserve of EPRDF members. Many young people are agonizing over this predicament.  Food aid, including food donated by our Western donors is openly used to coerce or lure hungry people into supporting Zenawi’s party.
  4. Using the law and the courts to make it difficult for political opponents to operate and make free expressions of ideas difficult: This package includes the issuance of the draconian Anti Terrorism Law where even a kid who throws stones during a demonstration can be charged with, and sent to prison for 20 years.  The Civil Society Law that virtually closed down all civic groups in the country, including those that do advocacy for women, children and the disabled.  Meles understands that civil society is the pillar of democracy and he has to cut the pillars before embarking on an election.   Zenawi has even written a proclamation regulating how international election observers should behave and work during the election.  Ethiopians are eagerly waiting to see which groups would agree to monitor the election under this law.   The recent accusation of many ethnic Amharas including an 80 year old man of staging a cup de tat and changing the charge into terrorism in the middle of the process is part of this package. In some situations the police and the courts are ordered to make the flimsiest of reasons to send opponents to prison.  The most famous case under this tactic is the case of Birtukan Mideksa, the chairwoman of UDJ that Meles condemned to serve life for reasons that is boggling even the minds of some of his supporters. But Meles and his inner clique know what they are doing.   They don’t want to deal with this courageous and intelligent young woman during and after the election that she was ready to challenge.  Meles knows she is a love of the people.  More importantly, she has that potent weapon of straddling two of the largest ethnic groups in Ethiopia. She has a mixed Oromo-Amhara ethnic heritage.  This young articulate lady and expert in the law was very difficult to box in a political debate.   Zenawi’s preferred to box her in the small room in Kaliti.  He knows that the case against her cannot stand a minute in a country that has rudimentary practices of the rule of law.   He faked an outrage out of nowhere and sent her to prison.   Had he been serious about the violation the terms of the pardon, that he falsely accused her of, he would have thrown all of the released prisoners who said the same thing at one time or another including Hailu Shaul who told a BBC journalist during an interview that he signed the pardon letter under duress.    Zenawi’s donors know very well why Bitrukan Mideksa, the icon of democracy and peaceful struggle in Ethiopia, is languishing in jail for over a year now.  Meles knows that they cannot risk their relationship with him over the case of “one person”, as one anonymous Western diplomat in Addis Ababa is reported to have said recently.   Birtukan remains a martyr for her people. The world is getting to know here more with each passing day.  She has just begun rocking the consciousness of freedom loving people around the world.  We, her brothers and sisters, will make sure that her name and cause is spreading across the globe like a wild fire.  She will soon become an albatross on Meles’s neck and definitely the necks of the donors who, in the face of this gross injustice, are looking the other way.  She is a victim of an election that is being carried out only to satisfy their need.
  5. Keeping uninformed public by blocking information and news from the people. A perfect example is the jamming of the Voice of America and Drutche Welle Amharic services, all dissident radio stations from abroad including blocking Ethiopian democracy websites.  When caught they don’t hesitate to make bold and shameless lies.  Officials like Bereket Simon and Shimeles Kemal (it is amazing that his name rhymes with the word shameless) are unleashed to issue blunt denials (aynen ginbar yargew).  These guys have amazing capacity to deny even if you catch them with their hands in the cookie jar.  Consider this lie for example.  “This is absolutely a sham,” Shimeles told CPJ, when asked about the Ethiopian government jamming radio stations. He added, “The Ethiopian government does not support the policy of restricting foreign broadcasting services in the country. Such practices are prohibited in our constitution”.  Shameless Kemal also told CPJ that the allegations were part of a “smear campaign” by “opposition web sites in the Diaspora”.  That he said all of these with a straight face is staggering.   But isn’t it interesting that Meles spends millions of dollars on jamming radio programs broadcast by the US government while at the same time stretching his hand and receiving food aid and other assistances? Blatant lying has always been used by Meles and his cronies. Since we always cut them a lot of slack for lying, they normally think we have accepted it.  We are dealing with a group of people who claim they have brought equality between Ethiopia’s ethnic groups when everybody in Ethiopia sees that 95% of the key commanding officers of the armed forces of the country are staffed by officers from Zenawi’s ethnic party, with the Oromo, the largest ethnic group in the country contributing Zero. Zenawi is the quintinsential Orwellian and his donors who insist on holding this sham election are willful participants against a crime being committed on 85 million people.
  6. Control the Election infrastructure fully: This is the last line of defense. Meles has put the fox in charge of the henhouse.  Under this group of tactics comes the staffing of all election personnel from the national election board down to the polling station by members of Meles Zenawi’s party and cadres. They have shamelessly declared that they are neutral while the opposition says they have proof that they are not.  

The Endgame:

Meles Zenawi’s end game is making sure that the Ethiopian people are a broken and subdued people, incapable of putting up any resistance during and after the election and that the opposition is as broken and as weakened as possible. The goal is to make Election Day and the days that follow as tranquil as possible so that the congratulations from Barak Obama, the leaders of member nations of the European Union will be paraded in fanfare.  If the post election time goes by without declaring emergency, killing and rounding up people and herding them in concentration camps, it will be lauded as a great improvement over the previous election by the donors.  In the best traditions of Africa’s dictators, Meles Zenawi will be assured of staying at the helm of power for a quarter of a century and, who knows, even beyond.

But then again this assumes that the Ethiopian people may stay broken and suppressed and do not want their rights and dignity back.  But what if they say “give me liberty or give me death” as many indicators seem to suggest?  What if more and more Ethiopians begin sharing the views of an Ethiopian in Kenya who recently told a journalist, Lauren Gelfand, of World Politics Review “the West thinks stability in Ethiopia is more important than democracy, destabilizing is the only way to change”.   Let’s hope the enablers of the misery of the Ethiopian people wake up before this view gets off the ground. Ethiopians are waiting with a thinning out patience. Careful eyes can already see that they are sitting on the fence.

Fekadeshewakena@yahoo.com

Open letter to the UK Department for International Development

Open Letter to Mr. Thomas

Department for International Development
1 Palace Street,
London,
SW1E 5HE

March 10, 2010

Dear Mr. Thomas,
Thank you and the Department of International Development for your December 15, 2009 response to my letter of November 6, 2009, on behalf of the Solidarity Movement for a New Ethiopia (SMNE), where we expressed strong concerns regarding the alleged improper use of UK humanitarian and development assistance to Ethiopia by the Ethiopian government of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.

We additionally voiced concerns regarding the continuing human rights abuses, the closing off of any political space in anticipation of the May 2010 election, the imprisonment of opposition leaders like Birtukan Mideksa, the vast leasing of Ethiopian land to foreign companies amidst growing hunger and rampant corruption; all of which have gone unchecked.

We deeply appreciate the fact that you and your department took these concerns very seriously; even traveling to Ethiopia to meet with government authorities and other civil society members, among them, PM Meles Zenawi, in order to better ensure that British taxpayer funding is not being diverted to weapons, the deep pockets of the EPRDF elite or to shore up flagging political support for a increasingly repressive and unpopular regime.

In your letter you explain the outcome of some of those discussions with Ethiopian government officials, like PM Meles, indicating that he strongly defended his government’s commitment to poverty reduction, health, education and water services. You encouraged us to verify this for ourselves and our findings, based on reports we have received from the ground, challenge these assumptions with the possible exception of some areas within PM Meles’ own region.

You reported that PM Meles promised to “take tough measures where evidence can be produced” of political bias related to aid distribution. However, our findings indicate that the Ethiopian government is actively suppressing any such evidence from emerging through an overall lack of transparency, by denying reports, by punishing informants and by preventing donor governments, foreign journalists and others from gaining access to on-the-ground information. They are also repressing the democratic rights of the people, giving the EPRDF government unfettered power and control.

You also indicated that despite some positive actions taken in setting up the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, that your position was “there was room for improvement” in the area of corruption and if there was evidence of aid funds being transferred to foreign bank accounts that you would ensure a thorough investigation. We believe that enough evidence exists to call for such an investigation; particularly in light of the following information that seriously challenges the reliability of the Ethiopian government on numerous claims. Please consider:

  • Results of a year-long investigation by BBC Marvin Plaut expose evidence that implicates PM Meles and the current branch of the ruling Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) party of fraudulent use of Live Aid and other donated monies during the 1984-1985 famine relief effort when funding was channeled through the humanitarian branch of the TPLF. Reports indicate that Meles Zenawi, as leader of the TPLF at the time; directed up to 95% of donor funds, meant to alleviate hunger and starvation, to instead be used to buy weapons and to fund the TPLF organization. Witnesses report that aid funds were later deposited in bank accounts in Western countries. Although Meles and some others are officially challenging this BBC report, to many Ethiopians, this “news” is not new for they have known about these allegations for over a decade; however, until now, no major western news organization has taken the initiative to investigate them.
  • Charges continue to surface regarding the ongoing Ethiopian government misuse of foreign assistance; including allegations that Productive Safety Net Program funds from donor countries, like the UK, are being politicized and abused by the TPLF ruling party. Reports of such improper use of aid cannot be investigated by a government reported to be complicit with the abuse, also making an independent audit process more difficult where cooperation with the authorities is important; however, it does not negate the need for such an audit.  Here are two examples of the active suppression of information:
    • When journalist, Jason McClure, from Bloomberg News, attempted to investigate reports regarding the misuse of Productive Safety Net Program funds, PM Meles did not “take tough measures,” as he assured you; but instead, Mr. McClure was arrested and within 24 hours was kicked out of the country.
    • Six individuals from the Tigray region (Meles’ own region) were allegedly going to be interviewed by Jason McClure, but were instead beaten and then arrested by some EPRDF party members.  Apparently were going to provide evidence regarding the misuse of funding for the Protective Safety Net Program.
  • A recent report from Financial Action Task Force (FATF), as the global standard setting body for anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT), identified Ethiopia as being among the world’s top five worst countries (along with Iran, North Korea, Angola and Ecuador) in the world for strategic AML/CFT deficiencies and called on its members “to consider the risks to the international financial system arising from such deficiencies.”

The FATF stated that “despite its efforts…Ethiopia has not committed to the AML/CFT international standards, nor has it constructively engaged with the FATF or the FSRB as of February 2010.” They indicate that lack of such compliance makes not only Ethiopia, but also others involved with them, whether inside or outside their borders, extremely vulnerable to illicit activities. (Please see: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/34/29/44636171.pdf).

  • Repressive laws restricting civil society in Ethiopia are among the most restrictive in the world. As of January 2010, the new Charities and Societies Proclamation law was implemented, criminalizing the advancement of human rights, disability rights, gender equality, children’s rights, conflict resolution and the promotion of democracy and good governance for any civil society members/institutions that received 10% or more of its funding from foreign sources. 

In addition, in other legislation, another new draconian, but vaguely defined, anti-terrorism law was enacted that included criminal penalties for actions that might be seen elsewhere as legitimate expressions of public protest—such as “creating a public disturbance.” In other words, the UK should not assume that Ethiopian institutions/civic organizations will ensure or even promote free and fair elections as most are dysfunctional, not independent and are simply meant to create the perception of an active civil society where none exists.

  • Currently, the media is nearly completely controlled or blocked in Ethiopia. The only non-governmental radio programs being heard in Ethiopia are the Voice of America Amharic program, Deutsche Welle (Germany) and Addis Dimts (Ginbot-7); all of which are now being jammed. The government controls most every other media source, including blocking opposition websites, TV, FM radio and news agencies. The government is the only Internet provider (Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation) and Internet penetration in Ethiopia (0.4%) is less than Somalia (1.0%) is among the lowest in the world.
  • The upcoming May 2010 Ethiopian National Election should already be considered invalid due to pre-election interference with political campaigns and the harsh repression of political candidates—through imprisonment (Birtukan Mideksa), intimidation, beatings, threats and now a suspected political assassination—all of which has created a political atmosphere that is neither free nor fair before a vote has ever been cast. Unobstructed voting in May will not rectify the deeply flawed pre-election conditions that have overwhelmingly prevented participation from non-government-controlled candidates. Here are some examples:
    • All political parties and candidates are expected to sign a Code of Conduct, prohibiting them from making any critical remarks about the current government.
    • It has become almost impossible to register as an opposition candidate without interference; often violent in nature.In some areas, only the ruling party is allowed to register their candidates.
    • On March 2, five men brutally murdered Mr. Aregawi Gebrehannes, a strong opposition candidate in the Tigray region who was running for parliament against the ruling TPLF party of Meles Zenawi. He had been threatened and beaten previously regarding his candidacy. No internal inquiry is expected to be impartial.

Is this the kind of free, fair and peaceful election that the British taxpayers seek to support? We believe that the above-mentioned factors are very serious concerns that call into question the Ethiopian government’s past and present stated claims and require additional investigation, audit and safeguards to ensure that UK aid is not misused; particularly in light of your new commitment of 20 million pounds. The Ethiopian people are in great need of humanitarian aid, but not of aid that ends up being diverted to repress the political process and the rights of the people. Had such aid been directed to agricultural development and new technologies over the last 19 years of the Meles regime; undoubtedly, this degree of need would not exist.

Instead, there is too much evidence pointing to the mishandling of donor funds to justify not delving deeper into these concerns through an official investigation; specifically in regards to funds given by the UK. Therefore, we strongly support the British Minister of State for Africa Baroness Glenys Kinnock’s call for an investigation into the misuse of UK aid by the EPRDF regime; however, the EPRDF are unlikely to be impartial and instead such an investigation should be independent and include representation of the donor (UK), who ultimately bears the burden of responsibility to the British taxpayer.

Recommendations for the most urgent and critical actions:

  • Require immediate and unlimited access to the Ogaden by an independent team of international NGO’s, human rights groups and UK development representatives due to concerns for the people since humanitarian access being blocked to the region for nearly two years when 42 NGO’s assisting in the area were kicked out. A team should evaluate the conditions of those cordoned off from the outside world to ensure that concentration camp-like conditions do not exist. Arrangements should be made beforehand with insurgency groups, like the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) to assure safety; recognizing that reports alleging that this government has at times staged attacks and then blamed insurgency groups and others for those attacks in order to achieve a political purpose.
  • Completion of an in-depth independent audit of the Productive Safety Net Program, which would determine if UK funds were used appropriately as well as investigate allegations of politicized misuse of funding. Any investigation should also include the Ethiopian government’s rationale for why only limited areas of Ethiopia have Productive Safety Net Programs; particularly explaining why some of the neediest regions have continued to be excluded for so many years.
  • Investigate reports of money laundering by members of the TPLF/EPRDF in light of new FATF concerns and continued allegations. The potential international financial risk to anyone dealing with Ethiopia is exacerbated by the amount of large scale foreign investment going on at a rapid pace within the country. This has been accompanied by human rights abuses, dispossessing citizens from their land without compensation and the repression of the political process and the peoples’ rights. Many Ethiopians believe the Meles regime is robbing the country of its land, resources and finances while brutally suppressing any resistance. How will the UK respond?
  • The EPRDF has already broken its Constitutional obligation to provide a free and fair playing field to all political groups; therefore making the entire May 2010 election irreparably flawed, causing Ethiopia not to meet the standards for UK financial aid based on demonstrating progress towards democratic goals.  In light of this, will the UK support actions by Ethiopians to contest the legitimacy of this election? How will it affect UK foreign aid policy?

In closing, we do want to gratefully acknowledge your department’s willingness to engage in an open dialogue between yourselves and Ethiopians so as to ensure that British aid is used as a means to empower Ethiopians to independence rather than to inadvertently subsidize tyranny, corruption and dependence. Investing in the people of Ethiopia, who will always be there, is a much better long-term bet than investing in an unelected dictatorial regime.
Thank you again for your action-oriented response.  I look forward to furthering this discussion.
Sincerely yours,

Obang Metho,
Executive Director of the SMNE
PO Box 50561
Arlington, VA 22205
Phone: (202) 725-1616
Email: obang@solidaritymovement.org

Ethiopia Opposition Criticizes Airtime Allocation Ahead of Vote

By Jason McLure

March 11 (Bloomberg) — Ethiopia’s opposition criticized  media rules that give Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s ruling party and its four main allies 16 times as much airtime as the largestopposition party ahead of May 23 elections.

“In general the media is controlled, used, monopolized by the ruling party,” Negasso Gidada, a former president of Ethiopia who is now a leader of the opposition Medrek alliance, said in a phone interview yesterday. “Our stand is that the time allocation is unfair.”

The Ethiopian Broadcast Authority earlier this year awarded Meles’ Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front and four allied parties 199 hours and 15 minutes of time on state radio and 31 hours and 30 minutes on state television, according to figures from the EBA. Medrek, the country’s largest opposition grouping, was awarded 12 hours 15 minutes of radio time and 1 hour 45 minutes of television time.

“We have negotiated about this on our party council and they are not part of that council,” Hailemariam Desalegn, parliamentary whip for the EPRDF, said by phone today. “I don’t see unfairness in this issue.”

The Ethiopian government owns the only television broadcasters in the country, and the Horn of Africa nation’s radio waves are almost entirely controlled by government or ruling party-affiliated stations.

The allocation of airtime was based largely on the number of seats in parliament held by each party, according to Desta Tesfaw, director general of the broadcasting agency.

A second, smaller award of airtime will be made in the coming weeks based on the number of candidates fielded by each party, he said.
‘Notable Opening’
Prior to the country’s last elections in 2005, “there was a notable opening of the state media to the political parties contesting the elections,” said a report from the European Union electoral observer mission that year.

Opposition parties won more than 170 seats in the country’s 547-member parliament in that vote, though many opposition members refused to take their seats to protest what they said was vote rigging by the ruling party in some areas.

In ensuing demonstrations, security forces loyal to Meles killed 193 people. Dozens of senior opposition figures were jailed on treason charges. “Prime Minister Meles and his ruling party appear intent on preventing a repeat of the relatively open 2005 elections which produced a strong opposition showing,” Dennis Blair, the U.S. director of national intelligence, wrote in a report to the Senate on Feb. 2.

Finally, 5 years later, Carter Center publishes the 2005 Ethiopian Election report

Better late than never, although 5 years late, the Carter Center has finally published its finding from the observation of the stolen 2005 Ethiopian Election.

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Dr Berhanu Nega’s comment on the Carter Center Report;

Ginbot 7 Dimts Radio, 11th March 2010:

Audio
Audio
Audio

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http://www.abbaymedia.com/Image_Bank/Carter_2005_Ethiopia_Election.jpg

>>>>>Read Full REPORT (pdf)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Upon the invitation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, The Carter Center observed Ethiopia’s May 15, 2005 elections for the national and regional parliaments. The May elections marked an historic event in the country, as Ethiopia witnessed its first genuinely competitive campaign period with multiple parties fielding strong candidates. Unfortunately, what began with a comparatively open period of campaigning and an orderly voting process on election day, was followed by flawed counting and tabulation processes in many areas, repeated incidents of serious post-electoral violence including the killing of some many dozens of persons during electoral protests, a significant delay in finalizing election results, and an ineffective complaints review and investigation processes. In spite of the positive pre election developments, therefore, the Center’s observation mission concludes that the 2005 electoral process did not fulfill Ethiopia’s obligations to ensure the exercise of political rights and freedoms necessary for genuinely democratic elections.

Background. As an international observer mission, The Carter Center sought to provide an impartial assessment of the election process by evaluating the pre-election period, the May 15 voting, counting, and tabulation processes, plus post-election phases including, the complaints investigation process, the August 21 re-elections and the Somali region elections.  Throughout the observation, mission leaders, staff and observers met with government representatives, political party leaders, election officials, civil society members in the capital and at the regional and local levels. Field staff and observers coordinated with the election observation missions from the European Union and African Union in an effort to maximize observation coverage.

Pre-election period. The pre-election period witnessed unprecedented participation by opposition parties and independent candidates, and an unmatched level of political debate in the state dominated electronic and print media and at public forums held across the country. Political parties agreed to a Party Code of Conduct, committing themselves to compliance with provisions calling for fair play and supporting peaceful political competition.

Ethiopian civil society organizations were active in the pre-election period, observing election preparations and sponsoring a series of televised debates on public policy issues between government officials and opposition leaders.

Domestic observation, however, was hampered by a late National Election Board (NEBE) decision to deny some civil society groups permission to observe polling day. Although the Supreme Court overturned this decision, the ruling came only days before election-day, thereby severely inhibiting domestic observers’ ability to deploy widely throughout the country.

Election day. The May 15 voting process progressed relatively smoothly with Carter Center observers reporting that polling was calm and peaceful in the polling stations visited, with only limited incidents of disturbances reported. However, problems began to emerge during the counting and tabulation phases, with significant irregularities and delays in vote tabulation and a large number of electoral complaints.

Preliminary but unconfirmed reports of election results from the political parties began to circulate on election night suggesting that the opposition parties had scored significant electoral gains, especially in Addis Ababa and other urban areas. On the night of the election, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi declared a one-month ban on public demonstrations in the capital and brought the Addis Ababa security forces (soon to be under the command of the opposition that won Addis Ababa) under the control of the office of the Prime Minister.

Post-election results and violence.
After unofficial reports circulated in May showing the opposition controlling the majority of seats, preliminary results released over remainder of May and through June indicated the ruling EPRDF controlled a majority of seats. Opposition parties claimed fraud and organized protests, including taxi strikes and student demonstrations at the University of Addis Ababa. On June 3, the Center released a statement (see appendix) on its post-election observation, noting observers’ reports of improperly secured ballot boxes, intimidation and harassment of opposition agents, and calling on all sides to pursue legal channels to investigate complaints and resolve disputes.

Tensions continue to spread across Addis Ababa in the following days. On June 6-8, more than 40 people were reported killed by the security forces’ crackdown on post-election protestors. The Center released a short statement on June 9 (see appendix) expressing alarm about the death and violence, and calling on the government to curb the extreme measures of the security forces, and urging all sides to pursue peaceful means to resolve disputes.

Complaints review processes. In light of the political violence and killings, controversies over the tabulation process, and the overall deterioration of the post-election environment, the NEBE decided to postpone any further announcement of official results for one month until July 8, to allow a cooling off period and provide space for the parties to agree on an ad hoc election complaints review process. Between June 10-14, the political parties negotiated a multi-phased review process, and after an initial disagreement they signed an agreement on June 14, which established ad hoc Complaints Review Boards (CRBs) and Complaints Investigation Panels (CIPs). Electoral complaints were to be submitted in writing to the NEBE, along with all available evidence and the CRBs would then rule on which complaints to submit to CIPs for further investigatation.

During June and July, the Center observed the conduct of the review and investigation processes of the CRBs and CIPs. The first Complaints Review Board (CRB1) reviewed the entire body of complaints. A second review board (CRB2) allowed parties to lodge an administrative appeal of complaints rejected by CRB1. Following the reviews by the CRBs, the CIPs investigated complaints and recommended a course of action to the NEBE, which made the final decision over the appropriate course of action.

During the CRB/CIP process, 383 complaints from the polling station, constituency level, and general complaints against the NEBE were submitted to the CRBs for consideration. The CRB1 deemed 151 of these to be worthy of further investigation by 26 CIPs. Complaints not approved by CRB1 were then appealed to the CRB2, which approved 29 more complaints for review by 18 new CIPs. 179 constituencies were affected.

While the CRB/CIP process went forward, the NEBE’s tabulation processes continued simultaneously. At the start of the CRB/CIP process, the only official results had the opposition winning an unexpected 29 out of 40 seats. However, further into the complaint review process, preliminary results were released on July 26 which indicated that the opposition controlled 172 seats of the announced 435, a significant shift from percentages indicated by the early partial results. The delayed release of results and the problems that emerged during the complaints process combined to create further tensions in the political environment.

Based on extensive observations of the CRB/CIP processes, the Center ultimately concluded that while the CRB/CIP processes provided important space for electoral dispute resolution processes, overall the NEBE’s complaints and review processes did not provide an adequate means for resolving serious disputes. (See Carter Center statement of September 15).

August re-run and Somali region elections. Based on the results of the CRB/CIP processes, the NEBE decided to rerun elections in 31 constituencies on August 21, 2005, the same day as the Somali region elections. The Carter Center observed both elections. Although 26 of the 31 revotes were held in constituencies provisionally won by opposition candidates, the ruling EPRDF won all 31 seats.

In addition to a few minor administrative problems, Carter Center observers reported a series of serious flaws in the August 21 polling process. These included credible reports of an unnecessarily large security force presence and intimidation of opposition candidates and supporter. Overall, it seemed clear that many opposition candidates surrendered the contested seats, resulting in a sweep by the EPRDF coalition, even overturning previous defeats in five constituencies.

Voting in the Somali region was chaotic and disorganized, and included reports of significant irregularities. Individual clan leaders held complete authority to decide the political parties listed on the ballot in their constituencies. While this appears to have been common accepted practice in the region, Carter Center observers reported serious concerns about the integrity of the process.

Final results. The NEBE announced final election results on September 5, 2005 with the ruling EPRDF winning 327 seats (60 percent of the total vote), government affiliated parties claiming an additional 45 seats (8 percent of the total vote) and opposition parties winning 174 seats (32 percent of the total vote). Opposition parties rejected the results, citing the various irregularities and the flawed complaints review process.

On September 15, the Center released a final overall statement on the elections, which noted that while the pre-election process was laudable, the post-election period was marked by a series of problems, delays in vote tabulation, protests and violence, serious electoral complaints, and a prolonged dispute resolution process. The statement concluded that the CRB/CIP process did not provide an adequate means for a fair resolution of disputes. The statement also noted while a majority of the 547 individual constituency results appeared credible, there were a considerable number of the constituency results that had significant problems and whose credibility is in question. Whether this smaller group of constituencies was sufficient to change the outcome at the national or regional level could not be determined based on the evidence available to the Carter Center. Finally, the Center’s statement also called on dissatisfied parties to file appeals to the high court.

Unfortunately, political tensions continued to increase, and some members of the opposition decided to boycott the seating of Parliament in October. This was followed by a series of protests and another outbreak of political violence throughout the country in early November. According to an independent commission appointed to investigate the post-electoral violence, the government response resulted in the death of 193 people at the hands of the security forces between June and November along with the arrest of opposition leaders and supporters. 1
Overall, the center finds that in spite of the positive developments in the pre-election period,
the 2005 electoral process did not fulfill Ethiopia’s obligations to ensure political rights and freedoms necessary for genuinely democratic elections. The period following May 15 was marked by highly charged political tensions, inflammatory rhetoric from all political sides, several days of protests and electoral violence, killings and other human rights abuses by government forces, delays in vote tabulation, a large number of electoral complaints, a prolonged and problematic electoral dispute resolution process, and the resurgence of government and opposition clashes months after the conclusion of electoral activities.

>>>>>Read Full REPORT (pdf)

Live Aid-Arms Aid?

Was food aid pilfered?

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From The Economist online

THE BBC brought the 1984 Ethiopian famine to the world’s attention. The outcry in richer countries at the starvation of hundreds of thousands of people led directly to Band Aid, Live Aid, and a punchier approach to humanitarian aid. An investigation published last week by the BBC claims to have discovered that nearly all of the aid money handled by the Marxist rebel Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which then controlled northern Ethiopia, was spent buying arms to fight the Soviet-backed dictatorship of Mengistu Haile Mariam. TPLF agents disguised themselves as grain merchants. Their warehouses were purportedly filled with sacks of sand. One source estimated that 95% of the $100m the agents took in was pocketed by the TPLF.

All of this would be history, except that the TPLF has run Ethiopia since 1991, when Mr Mengistu was forced into exile in Zimbabwe. Technically, the country is ruled by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), an umbrella group which takes in former rebels from other parts of the country, as well as many younger Ethiopians. In reality, most of the power is concentrated in the TPLF—even though Tigrayans make up only 6% of the 80m population. The country’s prime minister, Meles Zenawi, was a leading TPLF commander. So were those who run Ethiopia’s intelligence service, its army, central bank, broadcasting, and many of the ministries. The TPLF is at the heart of the EPRDF’s campaign for a general election due on May 23rd. Mr Meles is likely to win, but perhaps not as cleanly as he would like.

Since his country is in receipt of the largest emergency food-aid programme in the world, this investigation matters. According to the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), 6m Ethiopians depend on food aid to stay alive and at least another 5m are in need of some kind of assistance. If cheating happened during the famine, cynics say, why not now?

But there are questions about the BBC investigation. Several of the sources on the scam have broken with Mr Meles, some are in exile and have opposition sympathies. It is not news that the TPLF siphoned off some money—it was widely pointed out at the time and since—but the sums are unlikely to have approached $100m. If they had, Mr Mengistu’s spy network would have made more of the deception required, as well as subsequent arms purchases (in any case, much of the TPLF’s arsenal was captured from the government). Aid workers who were on the ground at the time insist that most of the aid money bought grain that somehow found its way into the bellies of the starving. The organisers of Live Aid, including Bob Geldof, have denied the BBC’s allegations. Even if they were true, it does mean Mr Meles would follow suit today. Indeed, Mr Meles is more often accused of playing down the level of hunger in his country.

The allegations will make life harder for the WFP, which is already struggling to come up with funds to feed Ethiopians, year after year. Despite the more damaging accusations in the BBC investigation that some of the money was used to build up the political wing of the TPLF, Mr Meles is unlikely to come under any pressure from donors. As the single biggest recipient of British aid, with dollops of largesse from the European Union, America, and others, he may be considered too big to fail.

Nor is it likely the EPRDF will be brought to book over alleged harassment of opposition politicians in the run up to the election, including the murder this week of an opposition candidate in Tigray in unclear circumstances. A former ally of Mr Meles, Gebru Asrat, of the main opposition party, Forum for Democratic Dialogue, said that the candidate’s body had been cut into pieces, to intimidate other Tigrayans into staying with the TPLF. The minister of information maintains he was killed in a bar brawl. But the willingness of Mr Meles’s former comrades to speak out could mean a rockier and bloodier election campaign.

Source: Economist

East Africa is next hot oil zone

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NAIROBI, Kenya, March 10 (UPI) — East Africa is emerging as the next oil boom following a big strike in Uganda’s Lake Albert Basin. Other oil and natural gas reserves have been found in Tanzania and Mozambique and exploration is under way in Ethiopia and even war-torn Somalia.

The region, until recently largely ignored by the energy industry, is “the last real high-potential area in the world that hasn’t been fully explored,” says Richard Schmitt, chief executive officer of Dubai’s Black Marlin Energy, which is prospecting in East Africa.

The discovery at Lake Albert, in the center of Africa between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, is estimated to contain the equivalent of several billion barrels of oil. It is likely to be the biggest onshore field found south of the Sahara Desert in two decades.

Tullow Oil, the British exploration company backed by a $1.4 billion loan from the Royal Bank of Scotland, says its Ngassa field in Uganda may be the biggest find in the Lake Albert Basin to date with up to 600 million barrels.

Tullow has discovered reserves equivalent to around 2 billion barrels of oil in Uganda in the last four years. Most of the initial finds in East Africa were made by independent wildcatters like Tullow and another British firm, Heritage Oil, run by former mercenary Tony Buckingham.

Now the majors are moving in. Heritage recently sold its 50 percent share in two Lake Albert Basin fields to Eni of Italy for $1.5 billion.

Eni said the two blocks have the potential to produce 1 billion barrels and is fighting it out with Tullow for control of the reserves on the Ugandan side of Lake Albert.

The Italian company is busy expanding in sub-Saharan Africa and has interests in Angola, Nigeria, Gabon, Mozambique and the Republic of Congo.

The Ugandan government is negotiating with several majors with the financial clout to handle the enormous investment required to develop these emerging fields.

Front-runners reportedly include China’s state-run CNOOC, Total of France and Exxon Mobil of the United States.

Andarko Petroleum Corp. of Texas says it has hit a giant natural gas field off the coast of Mozambique, a former Portuguese colony that became independent in 1975. Norway’s Statoil is drilling in Mozambique’s Rovuma Basin.

Since the 2006 find at Lake Albert, one of the Great Lakes of Africa strung out along the Great Rift Valley, there have been at least 15 confirmed major strikes in the region.

The Indian Ocean island of Madagascar contains “enormous reserves,” according to Tiziana Luzzi-Arbouille of IHS Global Insight consultancy of London.

“What happened in Uganda made it easier for smaller companies to raise funding,” said Tewodros Ashenafi, head of Southwest Energy, an Ethiopian company exploring in the Ogaden Basin in the east of the country.

This is a vast 135,000-square-mile territory in landlocked Ethiopia that is believed to contain sizable reserves of oil. It is estimated to hold 4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas as well.

Malaysia’s Petronas, which recently acquired major blocks in Iraq, signed an exploration agreement with Addis Ababa in August 2007.

The main problem for the oil industry is that the Ogaden, like many parts of Africa, is a conflict zone, as it has been pretty much since the Cold War in the 1970s. This is one reason why exploration has been so tardy.

Separatist rebels of the Ogaden National Liberation Front have warned oil companies to keep away and in April 2007 attacked a Chinese exploration group, killing 74 people.

Petronas is also exploring in the Gambella Basin of western Ethiopia.

Somalia has been torn by wars between feuding militias and clans since dictator Siad Barre was toppled in 1991 but it is also considered to hold considerable oil reserves.

A 1993 study by Petroconsultants of Geneva concluded that Somalia has two of the most potentially interesting hydrocarbon-yielding basins in the entire region — one in the central Mudugh region, the other in the Gulf of Aden.

That was one of 10 such basins across Somalia, southeast Ethiopia and northeast Kenya.

More recent analyses indicate that Somalia could have reserves of up to 10 billion barrels.

But exploration remains an extremely hazardous undertaking. And it’s likely to become more so as the country becomes a major focus for U.S. counter-terrorism operations against al-Qaida and its affiliates who are dug in there.

Source: UPI

Embattled Zenawi Meets Geldof in Nairobi

The state-owned ENA reported the following.

http://www.abbaymedia.com/Image_Bank/Zenawi%20%26%20Geldof.jpgAddis Ababa – Bob Geldof said in Nairobi, Kenya that donor organizations involved in the distribution of relief in 19984/85 famine in Ethiopia at the time had condemned BBC’s recent allegation while discussing with Prime Minister Meles Zeanwi on Monday.

BBC’s allegation alleges that millions of pounds raised through Bob Geldof’s Live Aid concerts were diverted to fund TPLF rebel military operations in northern Ethiopia.

Ethiopia reinstates hefty fines against publishing houses

http://horseedmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/cpj_hi-res_logo.jpgNew York, March 10, 2010The Ethiopian Supreme Court reinstated fines on Monday against four newspaper publishing companies over their coverage of the disputed 2005 national election. The Committee to Protect Journalists calls on Ethiopian authorities to end their continuing pursuit of politically motivated charges related to the election.

Judge Dagne Melaku, presiding over a panel of three-judge panel, upheld fines initially imposed in July 2007 against the Fasil, Serkalem, Sisay, and Zekarias publishing houses for antistate crimes related to their newspapers’ reporting on Ethiopia’s 2005 elections, according to local journalists.

Monday’s ruling overturned a February 2009 High Court decision that had struck down the fines. The High Court said that a July 2007 presidential pardon, granted to numerous journalists and political dissidents who were facing antistate charges related to the election, also applied to the four publishing houses.

The publishing houses and their newspapers were forced to close in 2005 and were later banned by the government. The principals in the companies were acquitted of individual charges of antistate activity, although they spent 17 months in pretrial detention, according to CPJ research.

In its ruling on Monday, the Supreme Court ordered the principals in the publishing companies to pay the fines immediately or face the freezing of their assets, according to local journalists. Principals in the Serkalem publishing house, which owned Asqual, Menelik, and Satanaw newspapers, face a fine of 120,000 birrs (US$8,800); officials of Sisay Publishing and Advertising Enterprise, which produced Ethiop and Abay, face a fine of 100,000 birrs (US$7,400); principals in Zekarias, publisher of Netsanet, face a fine of 60,000 birrs (US$4,400), and officials of Fasil, publisher of Addis Zena, face a fine of 15,000 birrs (US$1,100). By Ethiopian economic standards, the fines are substantial.

The administration has used legal and administrative means to harass the owners of the four publishing companies ever since they were acquitted, according to CPJ research. In 2007, government prosecutors asked the Supreme Court to reinstate genocide charges against principals in the companies, but the government eventually dropped the effort. The government later blocked two of the publishers, award-winning journalist Serkalem Fasil and editor Sisay Agena, from launching new publications.

“The government continues to use the courts and administrative means to settle political scores against journalists who were acquitted after the 2005 election,” said CPJ Africa Program Coordinator Tom Rhodes. “We call on Prime Minister Meles Zenawi to end his administration’s unrelenting harassment of these journalists, which contradicts his public statements in 2007 that the government did not harbor a ‘sense of revenge’ toward its critics in the press.”

Source: CPJ

The BBC’s allegations over Ethiopian aid: what is the truth?

Aid workers must be pragmatic – if food was getting to people, then the money was doing its job.

Nicholas Winer -

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I have followed, with a certain incredulity, the recent story put out by the BBC that 95 per cent of the aid to the Tigrayean rebels was diverted. I mean, 95 per cent is a vast amount of money, and why, I ask myself, would any group of self respecting conmen steal it all? Surely they would need to show that enough good was being done, so that the cash cow would come back again and again and again. The cross-border aid process ran from 1984 to the fall of Mengistu’s regime in Addis. This was no one-off smash and grab.

Initially, the TPLF simply sent people from Tigray to Sudan to be fed and housed by the UN and the international NGO community. It seemed a cheap and efficient way to manage a famine in Tigray. But the horrific sight of 300,000 people arriving en masse was overwhelming. The Sudanese camps suddenly turned into a second Korem, until enough aid could be delivered to reduce the death toll. The TPLF consistently deny that this was what they had done. I, and others, couldn’t conceive how such a vast sea of people could have moved through such tightly controlled rebel territory without the active guidance of the TPLF.

What happened next is the crux of the BBC’s story and of Paul Vallely’s refutation in the Independent. There had been a good harvest in western Tigray, but the poor had no money to buy it. The TPLF, through their civilian wing REST, determined sensibly that buying from the producers to feed the consumers was better for all than dumping food aid into the market. Why, they argued, suppress the price of food for the few who had managed to grow enough to sell? This impeccable free trade logic from hardline Marxists won immediate sympathy. And so began the process of meeting merchants, handing out cash, and checking on both food distribution and nutritional levels.

Khartoum, before Sharia law and the “Courts of prompt and Instant Justice”, was a vibrant, dusty and chaotic city. TPLF soldiers swaggered around with gold cigarette lighters, and Johnnie Walker Black Label was their favourite tipple. REST had a large house in an expensive suburb, where rents were too high for us Oxfam types. It was a friendly house, with an endless flow of people coming and going. As foreigners, we never knew who was who, but no one was turned away, and the atmosphere was beguilingly appropriate for beginning a relationship of trust.

The recent angry response to the BBC by aging colleagues that every effort was made to build checks and balances into the purchase and distribution process speaks volumes about their real anxiety that many things could’ve gone wrong. They wanted to be sure that if food or money did go astray, it wouldn’t be because they’d been negligent. On that basis — and the detailed explanations of Paul Vallely — the more extreme claims made by the BBC must be discounted. But for the very same reason, so too must any outright denial that anything did go astray.

The truth, I think, lies somewhere between the two positions. The proud young TPLF fighters in Khartoum and the earnest workers of REST intermingled, working for the same cause, under the same authority. There was much we were never privy to as aid workers (and the same applied to journalists), and so it would be foolish to state anything too categorically. It was in the interests of both REST and the TPLF to ensure a continued supply of resources to them and their people. This they did by providing a satisfactory level of access. That was smart and logical thinking.

Had they not been of a Marxist orientation they would have had an easier time of it from the USA, and perhaps would not have needed to be so accommodating: they could have done with their own Charlie Wilson. As it was, the best they could have hoped for was to be considered the good ‘commies’, as opposed to the bad ones of Mengistu’s regime. The verdict too has to be out on what the CIA in Sudan did and didn’t know. At the time it seemed not enough, given their boringly incessant attempts to question aid workers coming out of Tigray, and yet rather a lot, given their involvement in the highly complex evacuation of Ethiopian Jewry to Israel.

The people they seemed most interested in were often the health workers who travelled widely, witnessed bombing raids by the Ethiopians, and saw where TPLF fighters were based. This was precisely what the spooks wanted to know about. The health workers, on the other hand, weren’t too pleased with these extra attentions, but they were the ones who knew whether the process was working or not. If the people weren’t hungry, then that was what counted. That was, after all, what the grain buying programme was for. That was what determined whether the money was well spent. Counting bags of grain was never going to be a fool-proof process, nor could it have been a guarantee of success. The process did work. The flood of refugees into the border camps slowed to a trickle, and health levels improved in Tigray. That’s what people gave Sir Bob their money for and, by and large, it did what was expected of it.

It was always evident that greater access, and thus greater accountability, was more possible with the structures established by the Tigrayeans than with those of the Eritreans. That this was so is still reflected in the different political realities of the two countries. So, I ask myself if the story even has the right focus. What happened to aid to the Eritrean rebels, where accountability was much harder to establish? What of the tales of an underground TPLF political prison in Gondar, to which no aid worker was ever granted access? No surprise there. This wasn’t just famine, but a nasty and brutal war zone. To suggest that the TPLF never pulled a fast one and took their share would be a very foolish and naive assertion.

Today the TPLF — sorry, government of Ethiopia — own vast tracks of sorghum-growing estates on the Sudan border, right next to Western Tigray where this all began. In a land where private property is illegal, these (ad)venture capitalists are a real success story. As ever, someone else is paying the price.

Nicholas Winer is the former director of Oxfam in Sudan and Ethiopia. He is also the author of “The Tethered Goat” a political thriller set in Mengistu’s Ethiopia.

Source: New Statesman

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